A tendency in biological theorizing is to formulate principles above or equal to Evolution by Variation and Selection of Darwin and Wallace. In this letter I analyze one such recent proposal which did so for the developmental ascendency. I show that though the idea of developmental ascendency is brilliant, this is in wrong order in the hierarchical structure of biological theories and can easily generate confusing. Several other examples are also briefly discussed in the note added. Published version: Biological Theory 2(1) (2007) 113-115.
In a thoughtful essay Coffman (2006) argued for the need of a general theoretical framework for developmental processes. He proposed that such a general theory, which he named the developmental ascendency (DA), indeed exist. He further argued that such a theory may supersede Darwinian evolutionary theory. While his first part of argument appears convincing, his contention that DA is superior to Darwinian evolution are in wrong theoretical order. It has been demonstrated recently , though the main ideas were already in earlier seminar works of Fisher (1930) and Wright (1932) , that Darwinian evolution implies thermodynamics, therefore DA. To the present author, such a mixed-up is not accidental: It reflects a conceptual defect in the understanding of Darwinian evolution persistent to these days ever since neo-Darwinism. The purpose of the present letter is to point out and to clarify this misunderstanding.
There are two profound and quantitative concepts embedded in Darwinian evolutionary theory (Fisher 1930; Wright 1932; ). The first is Fisher's fundamental theorem of natural selection (FTNS), which links the variation and stochasticity to the ability of a system seeking best places in its enormous functional space during its evolution. This intrinsic dynamical concept was initially formulated within the context of population genetics more than 70 years ago. Since then, its role has been found in all biological processes in which developmental processes are special cases. Its counter-part in physical sciences is the so-called fluctuation-dissipation theorem (Ma 1985) , one of the most important theorems in modern physics, associated with great names such as Einstein. The second fundamental concept is equally important, known as Wright's adaptive landscape, again proposed more than 70 years ago. It describes the possible final selection to which the system to evolve. Its physical science counter-part is the potential energy or Hamiltonian , the very quantity needed in any dynamical discussion in physics. Following Darwinian evolutionary theory, with the aid of FTNS and adaptive landscape, it has been demonstrated mathematically that thermodynamics is determined by Wright potential function in Darwinian dynamics (Ao , 2006 . As argued by Coffman, DA is implied in the thermodynamics. Therefore, these two logic relations imply that DA is a special case of Darwinian evolutionary theory. This would have already been suggested by the very terminologies associated with those general theories: Thermodynamics means no dynamics, because it only concerns with equilibrium or steady state processes; On the other hand, Darwinian evolutionary theory is an explicit nonequilibrium dynamical theory. The description of the mathematical structure embedded in its final steady state is thermodynamics.
Logically I have now reached the end of my reasoning: It have been demonstrated that Darwinian evolutionary dynamics implies DA, not the other way. Nevertheless, it is not so simple in reality. Let me further address a few more specific and interesting issues raised in Coffman's essay to make my point more clear.
Acceptance of adaptive landscape in biology. In the Abstract his essay Coffman acknowledged that the general idea of his DA was already implied in a somewhat ignored Ulanowicz's ascendency theory in ecology (Ulanowicz 1980) . In text he discussed a few reasons for such neglecting, which are very plausible. Here I would add two more reasons. The first lies in the mathematics. Until recent, there was no general mathematical framework to accommodate Wright's adaptive landscape in a generic nonequilibirum setting. A detailed mathematical discussion is beyond the present letter. Relevant literature can be found elsewhere (Ao , 2006 .
The second additional reason is biological. Ever since the formulation of neo-Darwinism, Fisher's FTNS and Wright's adaptive landscape had not been fully understood and had been controversial. Those misunderstandings had been summarized by Gould (2002) , a book cited in favor in Coffman's essay. While Gould's criticism on neo-Darwinism may be valid, he had no good reason to dismiss those two quantitative concepts as violating contingency, individuality, and interaction, three ideas central in Darwinian evolutionary theory. It has been shown that after clarifying the imprecise statements associated with the original formulations, Fisher's FTNS and Wright's adaptive landscape are indeed consistent with those three central ideas in evolution . Furthermore, Gould's dismissing appears rather odd viewing from the punctuated equilibrium theory which Gould himself helped to establish: It is now known that Fisher's FTNS and Wright's adaptive landscape actually provide a sound theoretical and quantitative foundation to dis-cuss punctuated equilibrium.
If such confusions were not clarified, it would be likely that Coffman's DA would suffer the same fate as that of Ulanowicz's.
Natural selection vs autocatalytic cycle. Coffman suggested that "natural selection is an emergent property of autocatalytic cycles". Again, this is in wrong order. First of all, it has been universally accepted that at its beginning there did not exist such cycles on Earth. A complete discussion of this issue would go into philosophical issues regarding to teleological reasoning beyond my letter. Suffice it to say that natural selection gives arise to the autocatalytic cycles and the variation is the source of innovation and creation. Without variation, we would be in a deterministic world, a perspective rightly argued against by Coffman. Once such cycles are fixed by selection, or, borrowing the language from Waddington (1959) , are canalized, it provides the adaptive landscape for further evolution and, concomitantly, for further selection.
Such dynamical phenomena suggest that Darwinian evolutionary theory has essentially two parts: the dynamical structure encoded in evolution by selection and variation, further classified into four dynamical elements by following ideas of Fisher and Wright (Ao , 2006 ; and the structure of each dynamical element in a given biological process. Same classification of two types of fundamental laws in biology has also been proposed recently from a completely different perspective (Wilson 2006) . Today it should be evident that Darwin and Wallace (Darwin 1958 ; Darwin and Wallace 1858) got the dynamical part completely correct nearly 150 years ago. Since then, this dynamical part has been demonstrated to be independent of specific biological instantiation and has been applied to biological processes ranging from gene regulation, metabolic pathways, ecology, cognitive science, etc (Wilson 2006 ). This dynamical part of evolutionary theory is sufficient to give arise to the developmental ascendency as reasoned above. Nevertheless, it is also well known that Darwin and Wallace did not get the structures of dynamical elements for the heretic process correct, among others: Mendel's theory was unknown to them. Clearly, we too have not completely understood all structures of all dynamical elements, such as those in developmental processes. The desire to understand such structures has been one of major driving forces in modern biological and medical research.
Coffman pointed out that the gene regulation is an example to illustrate his DA, with both positive and negative feedbacks, abundant in developmental processes (Davidson 2006) , with which I completely agree. I wish to further point out that Darwinian dynamics exemplified by adaptive landscape and stochastic force has been quantitatively used in the modelling a gene regulatory network, the lambda genetic switch formed by both positive and negative feedbacks (Ptashne 2004) , where the dynamical elements are determined by the JacobMonod operon theory constraint by physical and chemical laws. It has now achieved quantitative agreement between the theory and experiments and with further predictions (Zhu et al 2004) . There has been a continuous progress in the experimental determination of the gene regulatory structure in the complex developmental processes such as that of sea urchins (Davidson 2006) . It is conceivable that a biological theory similar to that of Jacob-Monod to specify the dynamical elements may soon be available and that a quantitative and predicative Darwinian dynamics study of such complex developmental processes may be readily carried out in various theoretical/computational labs. This may be regarded as an explicit example for the universality of Darwinian dynamics.
Darwin and Einstein. Coffman correctly observed that "Einstein's general theory of relativity contextualizes Newtonian physics". However, above analysis shows that the same logic cannot be applied to DA with regard to Darwinian evolutionary theory. Einstein had deeply modified the dynamical structure of Newtonian dynamics. DA has not changed, and will not change in my opinion, the structure of Darwinian dynamics. Note added, Aug. 6 (2007) . An interesting article in New York Times a week ago 16 promoted the cooperation theory (CT), where CT was placed as equal to the Evolution by Variation and Selection. Given above analysis, this still appears a little uneven: CT is only one of many realizations of Darwinian dynamics. Let me elaborate this point further below, because it strengthens the argument in the text.
As already discussed 1, 13 , there are two types fundamental laws. One is of course the dynamical laws embedded in Evolution by Variation and Selection. The other is its realization, which is arguably best represented by the theory of Mendel-Watson-Crick, at least for what we have known so far on Earth. The advancement in human understanding of Nature may generate (artificial) life not bounded by DNA and RNA in the future. For many biological studies, the Mendel-Watson-Crick theory is too fundamental to be convenient. More effective theories at given phenomenological levels should be, and have been, developed. The theory of developmental ascendency 3 is such an example. The well known self-organization theory (SOT) is another realization 17 , and CT appears to a special case of SOT. Let's grant CT's independence from SOT to simplify the presentation. Both CT and SOT
